Summary

In their operation, the constitutional bodies of authority must proceed from the limits set by the constitution, and the Court of Constitutional Review is the institution that in problematic cases must determine these limits. From the standpoint of the legislator, however, this means that in constitutional issues, the parliament cannot be the final judge as regards itself.

Such an approach is due to the fact that the Court of Constitutional Review is not a political institution, and the Supreme Court in its judgements has clearly expressed its reluctance to stray onto the territory of the legislature. The problem from the viewpoint of the Court is that despite the general cohesion of the decisions by the Supreme Court the necessary legal mechanisms for ensuring their compliance by the legislator do not exist. Although constitutional guarantees for compliance with court decisions do exist, actual compliance with decisions (method and time) tends to be a discretionary power of the legislator.

This article examines the practice by the legislator in implementing the decisions of the Court of Constitutional Review. The main objective is to describe the legislator’s various behavioural possibilities, and the actual behaviour of the legislator as regards the decisions of the Supreme Court. In addition, there is also coverage of the role of the Supreme Court as an influencer of the legislative process.